Geopolitical competition in the international system

Jonathan Leader Maynard; Ken Davies; Lucy Arora; Phil Entwistle

Overview

Since the end of the Second World War, the UK and its allies have supported a ‘rules-based international order’, defined as an interconnected set of international organisations, laws, regulations and shared norms.[1]

Some governments and analysts believe that this international order is under increasing strain.[2]

In 2021, the UK Government identified the challenge of ‘systemic competition’, which it defined as “a growing contest over international rules and norms; the formation of competing geopolitical and economic blocs[…]; the deliberate targeting of the vulnerabilities within democratic systems […]; and the testing of the boundary between war and peace”.[3]

Similarly, the report for the February 2025 Munich Security Conference identified “an ongoing power shift toward a greater number of states vying for influence”. It stated that the “world has become more polarized”, with challenges to political and economic liberalism within democracies and a growing ideological split between democracies and autocracies.[4]

Contest over international institutions and norms

One of the international institutions being contested is the United Nations. Some countries have concerns that the UN Security Council’s permanent membership (the UK, US, France, China and Russia) does not reflect the modern distribution of global power.[5] Others have questioned the council’s effectiveness in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from February 2022[6] and conflict in the Middle East.[7]

Growing tension between the permanent members of the Security Council has led to increasingly competitive efforts to solicit the support of ‘middle-ground powers’ or ‘Global South’ countries, [8][9][10][11] and to gain influence through other multilateral bodies. These include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[12][13] and the recently expanded BRICS bloc of emerging economies.[14][15] New institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) may also increase the ability of states to organise in forums where the UK would not normally be involved.

There is also increased competition and challenge in relation to international norms. Fellows at the Atlantic Council think tank have written that China’s Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative represent an effort by China towards a more global “state-focused and state-defined values system”,[16] potentially with less emphasis on human rights obligations.[17] Historian Nils Gilman identifies other contested aspects of the international order: the idea that international borders should not be rewritten by force, the idea that global economic and financial integration is beneficial, and the idea that disputes among nations should be resolved via multilateral institutions.[18] Geopolitical competition may also affect how some countries engage in multilateral negotiations on, for instance, climate change,[19] space,[20] AI,[21] and technology development.[22]

Despite patterns of competition, notable areas of global cooperation persist. In September 2024, for example, the UN General Assembly agreed the Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact, and the Declaration on Future Generations at the UN Summit of the Future.[23] To the President of the United Nations Foundation (UNF), Elizabeth Cousens, these documents provided an “essential basis” for “stepped up cooperation”.[24] The Pact for the Future also stated principles for future Security Council reform, including improving the representation of “underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups”, and enlarging the council to be more representative of the UN membership.[25]

Polarisation within and between democracies

Following the inauguration of Donald Trump as US President in January 2025, the US Government has expressed scepticism towards international institutions and norms. For example, it has initiated withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and from the World Health Organization.[26] [27] There have been concerns about a changing US stance on NATO and its participation in transatlantic cooperation on security more broadly,[28] while intensifying competition with China and broader involvement in the Indo-Pacific region.[29] As a result, it is widely suggested that European NATO members, including the UK, will need to invest more in defence.[30]

Some commentators have stated that the new US Republican administration appears to have a more transactional approach to international relations, [31] potentially affecting international cooperation on ‘common good’ issues, such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.[32]

President Trump has implemented or promised tariffs on a range of states and goods from other countries.[33] This could have a negative impact on UK economic growth even if the UK were not a direct target of tariffs.[34] US trade policies could also put additional strain on the rules-based global trading system represented by the World Trade Organisation, which the UK is committed to.[35]

Hostile interference and influence in democratic societies

Some countries such as Russia, China and Iran have engaged in disinformation and forms of electoral interference (POSTnote 719, Cyber security of elections , Countering Russian influence in the UK).[36][37][38] It is difficult to measure the impact of such campaigns, but some commentators suggest they have the potential to increase public support for the interests of authoritarian powers, increase hostility to key features of the rules-based international order, and weaken democratic political systems and societies.[39][40][41]

Russia has engaged in various forms of ‘grey zone’ actions, defined by the United States Special Operations Command as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality”.[42] Actions include cyber-attacks on European railway networks, arson attacks on Ukrainian-linked businesses in Europe, and suspected attacks on undersea telecommunications cables.[43]

A ‘de-globalising’ world economy

Increasing competition may weaken international economic ties and the institutions that manage them. Wars and pandemics have prompted governments to prioritise their own economic security over international cooperation in recent years, including efforts at rehoming supply chains domestically (reshoring) or with trusted countries (friend-shoring).[44][45] This trend could be exacerbated by climate change and world population growth leading to competition for resources.[46] For example, evidence shows that conflicts around the world are preventing countries from cooperating on water supply in some areas of water scarcity.[47]

Competition over critical minerals is also increasing.[48] Some countries are also vulnerable to the ‘weaponisation of energy’: a strategy of manipulating energy prices and demand for political aims.[49]

Challenges and opportunities

The UK has strong convening power. The government hosted COP26,[50] the first AI Safety Summit,[51] and multiple international dialogues at Wilton Park.[52] British universities welcome 750,000 international students – including 103,000 from China, 127,000 from India, and 54,000 from Nigeria.[53] The UK’s ability to convene diverse representatives of state and non-state bodies, such as private sector companies, may be valuable.
The UK could influence international initiatives that protect core values through its permanent membership of the UN Security Council and strong links with Commonwealth countries.
The UK has strong historical and ‘people-to-people’ ties with the US.[54] The UK may have the ability to influence US foreign policy, including in relation to its level of engagement in European security. [55]
There is a risk to UK influence if alternative blocs, bodies and initiatives that do not share UK values and interests begin to supersede the existing international order.

Key uncertainties/unknowns

This is a fast-moving area. At the time of publication uncertainties include:

On Ukraine: Future US support for Ukraine, the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and broader efforts to prevent further aggression from Russia in Europe.
On the Middle East: The international order could be affected by war on many fronts, or a long-term agreement on a ceasefire and peace negotiations may lead to the normalisation of relations between Israel and other countries.
On global health and climate change: It is uncertain how another pandemic could affect global trade and communications and how far climate change could present new challenges.
On macroeconomic risks: Military conflicts and environmental disasters may be hard to predict, and increasing trade protectionism globally could have implications for UK growth.

Key questions for Parliament

How will the changing international order affect the UK’s pursuit of its values and interests abroad?
How should the UK make most use of its convening power to foster international cooperation and achieve the government’s aim to ensure respect for international law?
What reforms to international institutions are needed to enhance cooperation, buy-in and these institutions’ sustainability? How should the Pact for the Future be implemented?
Given limited diplomatic resources and planned cuts to the UK’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget available to support other countries, how should the UK prioritise its engagement with them and retain strong partnerships?
What measures should the UK take to defend the democratic system from hostile foreign influence, cyber-attacks, grey zone attacks, and other threats?
How can the UK work with European allies to strengthen European security if the US were to change its military aid and commitments?

References

[1] Mazarr, M. J. et al. (2016). Understanding the Current International Order.

[2] Tobin, J. (9 January 2025). Challenges to a rules-based international order – House of Lords Library

[3] HM Government (2021). Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

[4] Carr, R., Hammelehle, J., Koenig, N., Köhler, P., Kump, I. and Pauly, J. (February 2025). Munich Security Report 2025

[5] The UN Security Council has five veto-holding permanent members, including the UK, as well as 10 elected members. For more on UNSC reform, see Patrick, S. (2023). Cutting the Gordian Knot: Global Perspectives on UN Security Council Reform, as well as the accompanying chapters (by different authors) on Africa, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Turkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[6] Patrick argues that UNSC divisions have been amplified since the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war: “East-West tensions now intrude on [the Council’s] everyday deliberations, including the release of basic presidential and press statements”. Patrick, S. (2023). Cutting the Gordian Knot: Global Perspectives on UN Security Council Reform.

[7] Gowen has written of continuing divisions in the context of Israel-Palestine (since 7 October 2023), although notes that abstentions by China and Russia (and on Gaza, the U.S.) may undermine their political credibility but reflect “a form of (minimal and ill-tempered) cooperation.” Gowen, R. (2024) The UN Security Council in the New Era of Great Power Competition.

[8] Patrick, S. and Huggins, A. (2023). The Term “Global South” Is Surging. It Should Be Retired. Global Locations. The term ‘Global South’ is often used by policymakers, but Global South countries may be diverse in interests, economic power, type of government (such as democracy or autocracy) and strategic alignment on issues such as reform of the UN Security Council or the Ukraine war.

[9] HM Government (2023). Integrated Review Refresh 2023.

[10] Brooke-Holland, L. (2024). What is the Global South? House of Commons Library.

[11] UK Government (24 July 2024). International Development Minister begins reset of relationship with Global South on first overseas visit

[12] UK Government (2024). UK-ASEAN factsheet.

[13] US State Department (2024). The United States-ASEAN Relationship.

[14] Jütten, M., with Falkenberg, D. (2024). Expansion of BRICS. European Parliament Research Service. BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. On 1 January 2024, four new members joined: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia also participated in the BRICS Summit in October 2024 as an invited nation.

[15] Arab News (2024). Saudi foreign minister commits to BRICS cooperation at Kazan summit.

[16] Schuman, M., Fulton, J., and Gering, T. (2023). How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order – Atlantic Council.

[17] Chatham House (2022). Reclaiming human rights in a changing world order

[18] Gilman, N. (21 February 2025). Samuel Huntington Is Finally Getting His Revenge on Francis Fukuyama. Foreign Policy

[19] Council on Strategic Risks (9 December 2024). Geopolitics and the COP

[20] UK Space Agency (2022). National space strategy.

[21] Schmid, S., Lambach, D., Diehl, C., & Reuter, C. (2025). Arms Race or Innovation Race? Geopolitical AI Development. Geopolitics, 1–30.

[22] Foreign Affairs Committee (2022). Encoding values: Putting tech at the heart of UK foreign policy

[23] United Nations (2024). Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations.

[24] Cousens, E. (2024). The Summit of the Future — My Thoughts on What’s Next. United Nations Foundation

[25] United Nations (2024). Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations, Action 39.

[26] Bearak, M. (2025). Trump Orders a U.S. Exit from Main Climate Pact. New York Times.

[27] Faguy, A. and Hughes, D. (2025). US Exit from WHO could see fifth of budget disappear. BBC News.

[28] Council on Foreign Relations (2024). Donald Trump’s Positions.

[29] Grand, C. (2024). Defending Europe with less America. European Council on Foreign Relations.

[30] For example: Leonard, M. et al. (2024). Europe Alone: Nine Thinkers on the Continent’s Post-American Future. Foreign Policy.

[31] Agrawal, R. (7 January 2025). Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy Will Work for Some Countries. Foreign Policy.

[32] Economist (2021). As America retreats, regional rogues are on the rise.

[33] Maxim, R. et. Al. (2025). China’s retaliatory tariffs will hurt Trump-voting counties most. Brookings.

[34] Economist Intelligence Unit (2024). US election: impact on Europe.

[35] House of Commons Library, WTO: Challenges and Opportunities, 25 March 2024

[36] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2020). Russia. House of Commons.

[37] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2023). China. House of Commons.

[38] Marcellino, W. et al. (2020). Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election: Tools for Detecting Online Election Interference. RAND Corporation.

[39] Hollis, D.B., and Ohlin, J.D., eds. (2021). Defending Democracies: Combating Foreign Election Interference in a Digital Age. Oxford University Press.

[40] Dukalskis A. (2021). Making the World Safe for Dictatorship. Oxford University Press.

[41] Parliamentarians in the UK wrote to the Prime Minister in May 2024 to convey concerns; see Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (2024). JCNSS calls on Prime Minister to defend the UK’s democracy as snap election is called.

[42] United States Special Operations Command (2015). The Gray Zone.

[43] Gramer, R. (2024). Russia Ramps Up Sabotage Operations in Europe. Foreign Policy.

[44] Ellerbeck, S. (2023). What’s the difference between ‘friendshoring’ and other global trade buzzwords?. World Economic Forum.

[45] Beal, T. (2022). Economic security: A need for a renewed global effort. Chatham House.

[46] Challinor, A. and Benton, T. G. (2021) International dimensions. In: The Third UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Technical Report.

[47] UNESCO. (2024). The United Nations World Water Development Report 2024: Water for Prosperity and Peace.

[48] Quiggin, D., and King, R. (2023). Cobalt refining power gives China an advantage in the race for EV battery dominance. Chatham House.

[49] Falkner, R. (2023). Weaponised Energy and Climate Change: Assessing Europe’s Response to the Ukraine War. LSE Public Policy Review.

[50] HM Government. (2024). COP26.

[51] HM Government. (2023). AI Safety Summit 2023.

[52] Wilton Park. (2024). Wilton Park.

[53] Higher Education Statistics Authority. (2024). Where do HE students come from?.