DOI: https://doi.org/10.58248/HS74

Overview

After a challenging decade for UK-EU cooperation, relations appear to have stabilised. The Windsor Framework has fostered a new relationship, with leaders from both the EU and the UK celebrating a “new chapter”[1] and “close and friendly” cooperation.[2] The Framework resolved disputes over the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, and enabled progress in areas such as the UK’s association with Horizon Europe and the signing of a memorandum of understanding on regulating financial services.[3]

There is evidence that the war in Ukraine has improved UK-EU relations and has encouraged closer cooperation on sanctions, intelligence exchange, and the training of Ukrainian soldiers.[4][5] In November 2022, the EU admitted the UK to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) ‘Military Mobility’ project, which aims to streamline the movement of military equipment and troops across Europe.[6] UK participation in PESCO had initially been cautious because it represented the first instance of the UK joining an EU programme after Brexit.[7]

A 2022 poll of UK citizens for the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change indicated that the majority supported a closer relationship with the EU in some areas if the benefits are clear.[8] Some experts have identified cooperation on security matters as a promising starting point for building relations, with the potential to positively impact other areas of collaboration.[9] While there were earlier commitments to negotiate a new security pact, this was not included in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in 2020.[10] However, geopolitical changes have gradually changed the UK’s stance on the EU.

International changes, including the war in Ukraine and the possibility of a US retreat from its role as European security guarantor, may have impacted EU aims and interests.[11][12] Three EU-level responses to this new landscape are: [13][14]

  • using the single market and trading arrangements as geopolitical tools
  • reviving EU enlargement
  • a renewed interest in shaping Europe’s political architecture

The EU recently published its first defence industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness of the EU’s defence industry, limited to single market members and Ukraine.[15] The EU may use defence integration to achieve greater market efficiency.[16]

In 2024, the Labour government identified foreign policy, defence, and security as key areas for improving the UK’s relationship with the EU, with Foreign Secretary David Lammy labelling the EU as his number one foreign policy priority.[17] Lammy visited Germany within his first 24 hours as Foreign Secretary. Later that month, the Defence Secretary signed a joint declaration to deepen defence cooperation.[18] The Prime Minister met several European and US leaders at NATO and European Political Community (EPC) summits, reinforcing the UK’s commitment to being a reliable partner and ally.

Defence Secretary John Healey envisions a ‘UK–EU defence pact’ that would allow the UK to participate in EU military and civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. He also said he wishes to bolster cooperation on internal security matters, including illegal migration, border control, and terrorism.

Challenges and opportunities

The UK may face challenges due to current security and defence rules.

Non-EU countries face restrictions when trying to engage in EU defence initiatives.[19] One reason is that integration of non-EU countries with the EU Single Market determines their eligibility for participating in programmes like the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). This may pose a risk for the UK and for British defence firms who may over time find themselves excluded from defence procurement in the EU.[20]

The Single Market is an important aspect of EU policymaking.[12] Since the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Commission has tried to improve security and defence through the use of a ‘market-security nexus’.[12] The Prime Minister’s commitment to no customs union, no single market membership, and no freedom of movement will likely restrict progress for security matters.[21]

Increasing influence of right-wing populist parties throughout the Europe may influence the EU on migration, decarbonisation, and support for Ukraine.[22][23] This direction may be different to the UK approach in the future.

With fewer UK representatives regularly travelling to Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg to meet EU officials, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may be impacted by decreased knowledge of the EU and its complex institutions.[9]

Over the coming decade the EU may need to consider how to handle membership applications from Ukraine and Western Balkan countries. Discussions in the EU about a ‘multi-speed Europe’, in which countries have various levels of EU integration, may take place.[24] There may be an opportunity for Britain to determine a new relationship with the EU at this time.

Key uncertainties

The EU’s focus on the war in Ukraine, potential US political changes, and internal leadership transitions may affect its willingness and capacity to negotiate with the UK.[25]

Another uncertainty concerns relations with the US. Strained transatlantic relations could either push the EU to seek more alignment with like-minded partners such as the UK, or could revamp debates on ‘strategic autonomy’, thereby strengthening EU integration and putting even bigger barriers between the EU and the rest.[26][27]

Key questions for parliament

  • What specific areas should the Security Pact address? In which areas do the UK and the EU have the greatest need for mutual cooperation?
  • What is the government willing to offer to establish a relationship with the EU?
  • How much public support is there for the Prime Minister’s three key conditions: no customs union, no single market membership, and no freedom of movement? Have these conditions been evaluated against current public opinion?
  • The government has been active in bilateral diplomacy since the general election in 2024. What should be the balance between bilateral agreements and cooperation with the EU? What are the advantages of each approach, and when might they conflict with each other?

References

[1] European Commission (2023). Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with UK Prime Minister Sunak.

[2] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023). Foreign Secretary to hail renewed “close and friendly UK-EU cooperation” in first speech to EU Parliament.

[3] UK In a Changing Europe (2024). UK-EU Relations in 2024, p.10.

[4] Bond, I. et al. (2024). Working hand in hand? EU-UK co-operation in supporting Ukraine. Centre for European Reform.

[5] House of Lords European Affairs Committee (2023). The Ukraine Effect: The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the UK– EU relationship.

[6] Gallardo, C. (2022). UK joins EU military mobility project. POLITICO.

[7] Antinozzi, I. (2022). UK–EU Defence Cooperation and PESCO’s Military Mobility Project. Royal United Services Institute.

[8] Spisak, A. (2022). Moving On: How the British Public Views Brexit and What It Wants From the Future Relationship With the European Union. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.

[9] Grant, C. (2024). An open letter to Keir Starmer: Ten suggestions on how to foster better relations with Europe. Centre for European Reform.

[10] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. (2021). UK/EU and EAEC: Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

[11] Bond, I. and Scazzieri, L. (2022). The EU, NATO and European security in a time of war.

[12] Melvin, N. (2023). The UK and European Security: Five Key Lessons from the Ukraine War

[13] Moens, B. (2023). Ukraine kickstarts European enlargement, just as US backs away

[14] European Council (2023). European Council conclusions on Ukraine, enlargement and reforms.

[15] European Commission. (2024). EDIS | Our common defence industrial strategy.

[16] Håkansson, C. (2023). The Ukraine war and the emergence of the European commission as a geopolitical actor. Journal of European Integration, 46(1), 25–45.

[17] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). It’s time to reset Britain’s relations with Europe.

[18] Ministry of Defence (2024). Joint Defence Declaration signed with Germany on 48-hr defence diplomacy drive by defence secretary.

[19] House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee (2024). Corrected oral evidence: Implications of the war in Ukraine for UK defence.

[20] Centre for European Reform. (2023). Written Evidence to the European Affairs Committee.

[21] Berg, A. et al. (2024). EU-UK relations: Towards a post-election agenda. Centre for European Reform.

[22] Vinocur, N. (2024). As Europe votes, a populist wave surges.

[23] Coi, G. (2024). Mapped: Europe’s rapidly rising right.

[24] The Economist. (2017). Europe’s future is multi-speed and multi-tier.

[25] Kwapinska, K. (2024). The Ukraine war effort: More work for Europe with a potential US security withdrawal. UK in a Changing Europe.

[26] Tiessen, A-M-L. and Celik, B. (2022). Transatlantic security relationship under strain: Opportunities and challenges for the UK.

[27] European Parliament (2022). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity.


Photo by: Christian Lue via Unsplash

Horizon Scan 2024

Emerging policy issues for the next five years.