UK foreign policy in a changing world

Simon Brawley; Xavier McNally

Overview

Several themes were identified in the horizon scan for this topic, including the relationship between the UK and US, the future uncertainties of global alliances such as NATO, and how to enhance the UK’s reputation and influence.

The UK’s foreign policy position was outlined in the Integrated Review in March 2021 (IR21),[1] and updated in the Refresh in March 2023 (IR23) in response to significant world events, such as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.[2][3] The Refresh said the “transition into a multipolar, fragmented and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated”. One contributor to the horizon scan said the IR23 Refresh had a greater focus on cooperation with Europe and “middle-ground powers” than the Integrated Review.[4]

The UK Government stated in IR21 that UK foreign policy will be shaped by “a commitment to universal human rights, the rule of law, free speech, fairness, and equality”.[1]

In March 2021 the Ministry of Defence highlighted strategic threats to UK interests leading up to 2030, including maintaining alliances, reacting to changes in geopolitical and economic centres, and keeping up with rapid technological change and military modernisation.[5][6]

Foreign policy priorities

In September 2020, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was created to focus attention on soft power and development aid to build relationships with international allies.[7] As part of this, British universities, the NHS, and the UK Health Security Agency share their expertise around the world.[7]

One commentator said that the UK relies on its international reputation to strengthen relationships in groups like the G7 and NATO.[8] In 2021, the Ministry of Defence said that the UK should maintain an international presence to “support our friends and deter our adversaries”.[5]

The UK has also formed new agreements since 2021 like AUKUS, with Australia and the US,[9] the Global Combat Air Programme, with Italy and Japan,[10] and the Mineral Security Partnership with 14 countries and the EU.[11]

In July 2024, the Labour Government launched a Strategic Defence Review and said it “will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and prosperity, of the United Kingdom.”[12] The government said the Review will be delivered in the first half of 2025.

Challenges and opportunities

NATO

In 2021 the Ministry of Defence said that alliances, such as NATO, give the UK a “strategic advantage” by bringing the capabilities of member nations together.[5] Also in 2021, the UK Government stated that the UK will “be the leading European ally within NATO” and uphold the commitment to Article V of the Washington Treaty that an attack on one state will be considered an attack on all states.[5] In the 2021 Integrated Review, the government committed to maintaining nuclear deterrents assigned to the defence of NATO, and contribute to defence capabilities like the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’, an initiative to deploy military forces to increase the defence of Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe.[1][2] Polling by the British Foreign Policy Group showed membership in NATO was popular with 78% of the British public polled agreeing, and 59% of people supporting increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP.[13]

European Union

In the Integrated Review in 2021 the government said its defence and security focus will remain on Euro-Atlantic priorities.[1]

In 2023, the government reached an agreement, called the Windsor Framework, to facilitate the relationship between the UK and Northern Ireland by setting out, for example, goods regulation, the Single Electricity Market, customs, agrifood, and subsidy control.[14]

A Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was ratified in April 2021 between the EU and UK that guides the free-trade agreements.[15] In 2023, the House of Lords European Affairs Committee said that the political relationship between the UK and the EU prior the TCA was “highly unsatisfactory” and was “characterised by tension and mistrust”.[16]

After the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IR23), some commentators suggested that greater clarity was still needed on EU trade and development policy.[17] The European Council on Foreign Relations suggested that IR23 failed to comment on the UK’s desire to contribute to the EU’s Horizon Europe programme for research and innovation.[18] The UK has since rejoined Horizon Europe.[19] In January 2025, the Chancellor said she “could consider” the idea of the UK joining a ‘Pan Euro Mediterranean Convention’ in the future.[20]

The UK currently participates in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) programme, a EU cooperative initiative that allows EU member states collaborate on specific defence projects.[16] PESCO has 62 projects currently, with the UK participating in one.[21] Further UK participation is said to be on a “case-by-case basis”.[21] On 7 July 2024, the UK Government announced its intention to “reset Britain’s relations with Europe” including a new “UK-EU Security Pact”.[22]

Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’

In 2021, the Integrated Review referred to a ‘tilt’ in UK foreign policy focus towards the Indo-Pacific, and IR23 stated it to be a “permanent pillar of the UK’s international policy”.[2][23] IR23 also stated an intention to “increase our national security protections in those areas where Chinese Communist Party actions pose a threat to our people, prosperity and security”.[2] In November 2024, the Prime Minister said the UK Government approach would “always be rooted in the national interests of the UK, but that we would be a predictable and pragmatic partner” and that the UK would “engage honestly and frankly” on areas of disagreement.[24]

In 2023, the UK became the first member outside the region to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade agreement.[25] The region is important for UK interests because trade between the UK and Asia depends on shipping routes in the region.[23]

Notable policy activities already implemented as part of the ‘tilt’ include the Carrier Strike Group deployment (which began in 2021),[26] and contribution to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance between the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.[5]

However, one horizon scan commentator suggested that the UK lacks resources to commit investment to the region.[17] Another said that policy makers should make use of preexisting partnerships to broker new investment opportunities.[27]

AUKUS

AUKUS is a trilateral agreement announced in September 2021 between Australia, the UK, and the US. It is focused on developing and sharing military capabilities.[28] The partnership is composed of two ‘pillars’, with Pillar 1 presenting ambitions to develop nuclear-powered submarines, and Pillar 2 focusing on advancing cooperation on critical technologies, such as quantum devices or hypersonic missiles.[29][30]

The nuclear submarines will be developed by all three nations and built in the UK and Australia.[31] The construction of submarines in the UK is projected to bring growth and provide jobs, many in the North West of England.[32] In July 2024, the Defence Secretary estimated that the partnership would create 7,000 jobs.

In 2021, the UK Government said that AUKUS “will help sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific”.[28] The Royal United Services Institute reported discussions were to take place in 2024 with other nations, such as Japan and South Korea, to expand the partnership, in Pillar 2.[33]

However, there may be challenges for the AUKUS agreement. New Zealand stated that Australia’s new nuclear submarines will not be permitted in its waters.[9][29][33] Also, there are concerns that expansion of the partnership could appear adversarial towards other nations like China.[9][28]

Key uncertainties/unknowns

In the 2021 Integrated Review, the government recognised that the UK’s ability to engage in disputes between global powers, like the US and China, will be improved by cooperating on global challenges, like regulating technological advancements, climate change, and public health.[1] For example, the UK met with many countries, including China and the US, in November 2023 in Bletchley Park for the Artificial Intelligence Safety Summit.[34][35]

Some commentators suggest that the outcome of the 2024 US election may put strain on cooperation with the US. For example, before he was President, Donald Trump expressed negative views on NATO and talked about changing the US’ stance on Ukraine.[36][37] However, the UK currently has a strong relationship with the US on intelligence sharing and defence cooperation, such as with the Five Eyes Alliance.[5][38]

Commentators have suggested that investment in defence is a contentious issue between NATO member states and threatens the strength of the alliance.[39][40] At a summit in Vilnius in 2023, NATO member states agreed to spend a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence annually by 2030.[41] In 2022, seven member states were meeting the annual defence spending target,[42] and 11 met the target in 2023, while 23 out of 32 member states were projected to meet the target in 2024.[43][44][45]

Key questions for Parliament

What is the best way to use UK influence in the changing geopolitical landscape?
How should the UK respond to changes in economic power, such as towards Asia?
How will the UK manage changes in foreign policy focus, such as toward the Indo-Pacific, without harming existing policy in other regions, such as EU trade agreements?
How will the UK work with nations like China and the US on global issues such as public health, climate change and international trade?
Will the UK be able to engage with the US and China effectively on technology regulation issues?

References

[1] Mills, C. et al. (2021). Integrated Review 2021: Summary. House of Commons Library.

[2] Cabinet Office (2023). Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.

[3] Brooke-Holland, L. et al. (2023). The Integrated Review Refresh 2023: What has changed since 2021? House of Commons Library.

[4] Aspinall, E. (2023). The Refresh of the Integrated Review of UK Foreign Policy: 10 Key Insights. British Foreign Policy Group.

[5] Minstry of Defence (2021). Defence in a competitive age.

[6] Ministry of Defence (2023). Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.

[7] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). International development in a contested world: ending extreme poverty and tackling climate change, a white paper on international development.

[8] Cainey, A. (2023). Six Principles for a More Dynamic and Effective UK–China Strategy. RUSI.

[9] Brooke-Holland, L. et al. (2021). The AUKUS Agreement. House of Commons Library.

[10] Kubo, N. et al. (2023). Exclusive: Britain and Japan to pay for most of fighter project agreed with Italy-sources. Reuters.

[11] United States Department of State (2022). Minerals Security Partnership.

[12] Ministry of Defence (2024). Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms of reference.

[13] Aspinall, E. et al. (2023). Annual Survey of UK Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Global Britain. British Foreign Policy Group.

[14] Prime Minister’s Office (2024). The Windsor Framework.

[15] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK/EU and EAEC: Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

[16] Newson, N. (2023). The future UK-EU relationship: Report by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee. House of Lords Library.

[17] Maddox, B. et al. (2023). UK is too tight on the money and too vague on China. Chatham House.

[18] Witney, N. (2023). Sanity returns to British foreign policy. European Council on Foreign Relations.

[19] UK Government (2023). UK joins Horizon Europe under a new bespoke deal.

[20] Sky News (2025). Rachel Reeves ‘absolutely happy’ to look at joining EU customs group.

[21] Mills, C. (2022). EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): a future role for UK defence? House of Commons Library.

[22] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). It’s time to reset Britain’s relations with Europe: article by David Lammy.

[23] Brooke-Holland, L. (2021). Integrated Review 2021: The Defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific. House of Commons Library.

[24] Francis, S. and McKiernan, J. (2024). We want ‘strong’ UK-China relationship, says Starmer. BBC News.

[25] Department for Business and Trade et al. (2024). The UK and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

[26] Vavasseur, X. (2023). UK Aircraft Carrier to Return to the Indo-Pacific in 2025. Naval News.

[27] Nouwens, V. et al. (2024). Unnecessary Delay: The Integrated Review Refresh 2023. RUSI.

[28] Prime Minister’s Office (2021). UK, US and Australia launch new security partnership.

[29] Ministry of Justice (2024). AUKUS defence ministers joint statement: April 2024.

[30] Congressional Research Service (2024). AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress.

[31] The White House (2023). FACT SHEET: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines.

[32] Prime Minister’s Office (2023). British-led design chosen for AUKUS submarine project.

[33] Seok, S. H. (2024). Expanding AUKUS Pillar 2: An Inclusive Indo-Pacific Alliance Structure. RUSI.

[34] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office et al. (2023). AI Safety Summit 2023.

[35] Department for Science, Innovation and Technology et al. (2023). The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit.

[36] Arnold, E. (2024). The Possible Trump Effect on UK National Security and What to Do About It.

[37] Boynton, S. (2023). Why Trump’s ‘gross mishandling’ of classified info should alarm U.S. allies. Globalnews.

[38] Jessett, W. et al. (2024). How Refreshing? An Initial Assessment of the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh. RUSI.

[39] Debusmann Jr, B. (2023). Why are some Republicans opposing more aid for Ukraine? BBC News.

[40] McInnis, K. et al. (2023). From Burden Sharing to Responsibility Sharing. CSIS.

[41] NATO (2023). Vilnius Summit Communiqué.

[42] NATO (2023). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2022).

[43] NATO (2023). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2023).

[44] Buchholz, K. (2024). Infographic: Where NATO Defense Expenditure Stands. Statista Daily Data.

[45] Kirk-Wade, E. (2024). UK defence spending. House of Commons Library.

Photo by: Harland Quarrington, via Open Government Licence