DOI: https://doi.org/10.58248/RR105

The Nature’s Rights Bill is a private member’s bill introduced in the House of Lords. If enacted, it would recognise nature as “a legal subject and rights-bearing entity” to change the basis on which decisions affecting nature are made.

The bill sits alongside worldwide legal reforms, where rivers, ecosystems and other natural entities are granted rights in two ways. Natural entities are either given:

  • new, unique, rights, such as the right to be restored (and empowering anyone to speak for nature), or
  • legal personality (extending human rights to ecosystems and appointing legal guardians to act on their behalf)

Although these legal frameworks may differ, they share the aim of giving nature greater recognition.

Recent developments in the UK have promoted the “rights of rivers”. In February 2025, the River Ouse was the first river in England to be formally recognised by a local authority as having rights. This was followed by similar initiatives concerning the River Wye in May 2026. National and local campaigns are promoting the recognition of nature rights elsewhere in the UK.

Diverse values underpin our understanding of and relation to nature. There are competing views across cultures and societies regarding the intrinsic value of nature and whether it has rights independent of its relation to human society. The International Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services has said that policymaking prioritises a narrow set of nature’s values and largely disregards the other ways in which nature matters to people. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted under the Convention on Biological Diversity, recognises the range of views about nature and acknowledges that rights of nature may, in some countries, inform how biodiversity commitments are implemented.

These developments raise questions about whether existing legal frameworks are sufficient to respond to ecological degradation. Different ethical traditions offer different answers about how the environment should be valued and protected.

What are the ethical frameworks for protecting nature?

Modern environmental legislation and policy have been primarily shaped by anthropocentric (human-centered) approaches. Under this view, nature is a resource to be protected primarily because of the benefits it provides to people, such as clean water, flood regulation, food security and climate mitigation. The concept of ecosystem services, which focus on the benefits that nature provides to people, reflects this perspective. Duties to protect the environment are understood as duties owed to present, and sometimes future, generations of humans to protect those resources. Academic criticism of anthropocentrism has argued that it does not sufficiently address ecological degradation and that it has justified legal structures associated with environmentally harmful human activity.

Alternative ethical frameworks reject the notion of human superiority over nature and place greater emphasis on the value of the natural world. 20th century campaigners, including Aldo Leopold and proponents of deep ecology, argued that the natural world has intrinsic value that is independent of its usefulness to humankind. Conservation policy inspired by such a view focuses on protecting native species and semi-natural habitats, rather than the benefits they provide to humans. The idea that nature has moral value independent of human beings is contested; some philosophers argue that environmental value comes from long-term human interests.

The philosophy of biocentrism extends moral consideration to all living beings, including humans. However, its absolute requirement not to create harm and to refrain from interfering with the lives of other beings has been criticised for being impractical as an approach to environmental protection and for the survival of the human species.

A different approach, ecocentrism, emphasises maintaining healthy natural systems and their ability to function over time, rather than focusing on individual organisms. Under this view, it may be justified to sacrifice individual organisms, such as members of an invasive species, to protect broader ecological communities. Some animal rights campaigners have criticised this approach.

What ethical ideas underpin rights of nature?

The foundations of the rights of nature movement are varied and draw on different ethical traditions concerning the environment. One is Earth jurisprudence (and its practical application, wild law), which proposes that legal systems recognise the Earth as a community of interconnected beings with inherent rights. The aim is to shift legal thinking away from viewing nature solely as a resource and towards understanding humans as part of wider ecological systems.

Historically, most legal systems treated nature as property, but in the 1970s a legal scholar argued that natural entities could be represented through legal mechanisms like other entities that cannot speak for themselves, leading to changes in a number of countries. This was justified on the grounds that environmental harms are insufficiently represented within existing legal systems, and that recognising legal guardians for natural entities would help ensure that ecological interests are effectively brought before the courts.

Rights of nature initiatives sometimes draw inspiration from Indigenous traditions that emphasise the interconnected relationships between humans and the natural world, rather than viewing them as separate. Indigenous perspectives are diverse, but some view environmental degradation as stemming from a loss of awareness of the “interconnectedness that exists within Nature”.

Rights of nature advocates argue that the approach has several advantages. One is that nature’s rights will need to be considered when taking actions or drafting laws, resulting in less environmentally harmful outcomes. Another is that giving nature rights will contribute to “a change in popular consciousness” that will result in a moral transformation.

What are the main objections to rights of nature?

One common criticism of rights of nature is that non-sentient entities cannot possess interests capable of being represented. Some legal theorists have argued that rights can exist where interests require representation, even if rights holders (such as children) cannot articulate them. Others doubt whether ecosystems can meaningfully be regarded as entities with interests of their own.

Some scholars question whether rights are the appropriate method for protecting nature, arguing that “respect for nature and the inherent worth of living things” can be recognised without extending legal rights to ecosystems. They also argue that rights of nature is less transformative than it appears because it continues to rely on the “underlying logic and value” of the existing legal systems.

Some researchers suggest applying legal concepts developed for humans to non-human entities is “problematic” because it distorts the relationship between humans and nature. Social ecology researchers argue that environmental degradation is inherent in, and caused by sexual, racial and economic hierarchies, and cannot be ended without their dismantling these, and giving nature “rights” within these existing hierarchies will not protect it.

The risk that rights of nature might give rise to conflicts between different rights or different ecosystems is frequently raised by legal scholars. They suggest that presenting nature as separate from humans could lead to decreased support for environmental protection.

To date, empirical evaluations of the impacts of rights of nature remain limited and are largely based on a small number of jurisdiction-specific case studies (such as Bolivia or Ecuador). Research emphasises the indirect effects of rights of nature movements, including shifts in public perceptions of nature and the symbolic expression of ecological concern, with limited evidence to date of direct environmental improvements. Additional questions such the legitimacy and accountability of the institutions and guardians authorised to determine the interests of a natural entity are also regularly raised.

What alternatives have been proposed?

Critics of rights of nature have proposed that a range of alternative approaches to environmental protection can strengthen protection for ecosystems without extending rights to nature itself. They have highlighted existing human rights frameworks, which include the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (recognised by the United Nations General Assembly).

Some legal scholars argue that duties, rather than rights, should form the basis of environmental protection, emphasising the obligations owed by governments and individuals towards nature. Examples include the public trust doctrine, under which governments act as trustees responsible for protecting certain natural resources, and stewardship approaches, which emphasise the responsibility of those who control valuable or scarce resources to care for them.

A different strand of critique shifts the focus away from legal or institutional duties and towards individuals. Environmental virtue ethicists argue that a virtuous life involves the right attitudes and actions towards nature, as well as towards other human beings. They suggest this should include qualities such as respect for nature, care and frugality, as well as the avoidance of arrogance, cruelty and greed. They argue that applying this ethical outlook would protect nature without needing to recognise it as rights-bearing. However, philosophers question the efficacy of this approach, as research shows these character traits are not behaviourally robust enough to be effective.

Acknowledgements

Dr Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli is the Thematic Research Lead for International Affairs and National Security.

Professor Helen McCabe is the Thematic Research Lead for Arts and Humanities.

Questions about this briefing should be referred to Jonathan Wentworth (post@parliament.uk), who acted as parliamentary lead for this work.