Table of contents

DOI: https://doi.org/10.58248/RR97 

What is the digital targeting web? 

The digital targeting web (DTW) is an initiative in development that will combine and develop the digital services available to the Armed Forces on the battlefield. It will not be a single system or technology, but a series of interconnected systems that “better connect Armed Forces weapons systems and allow battlefield decisions for targeting enemy threats to be made and executed faster”.  

Similar initiatives are already in operation globally, but which differ in structure and purpose. For example, Ukraine’s DELTA is a “combat digital ecosystem” with a “Target Hub module for planning and directing the fire operations of military units”. The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine said it was used to support up to 2,000 successful strikes a day in 2025. 

The first elements of the UK DTW are due to be delivered in 2026. It is led by the Cyber & Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) and National Armaments Director Group (NAD Group) within the Ministry of Defence (MOD). 

How could the digital targeting web work? 

The UK’s DTW is not an independent system or project. Existing defence infrastructure and concepts will be important to its operation. A military concept is an “intellectual starting point for solving an operational problem”. 

Integrating defence systems and concepts 

The Armed Forces operate across five domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The capabilities for operations in these domains are provided by the military commands: 

Integration of the Armed Forces across all five domains is a goal of the Ministry of Defence. The Integrated Force Model, announced in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), builds on NATO Multi-Domain Operations, in which “NATO [will] orchestrate military activities across all operating domains and environments”. The government accepted all 62 recommendations in the SDR, including to deliver a DTW in 2027, with a “minimum viable product” in 2026. 

In January 2026, the Secretary of State for Defence said that integration will combine Armed Forces capabilities to “deliver increased scale, speed, and precision”. The Integrated Force would utilise a ‘single force’ design to ensure all available intelligence and capabilities are at hand to all forces. 

Force design and direction is led by the Military Strategic Headquarters under the Chief of Defence Staff to allow Defence to act as one unified force in “planning, readiness, deployment, and procurement”. The Integrated Force design will be published in 2026, with implementation to follow. 

The Integrated Force and the DTW will be underpinned by a common digital foundation, common standards, and data sharing. The Digital Backbone, a separate programme run by Defence Digital, aims to provide the foundation by bringing together 11 sets of digital defence services. Once developed, the Digital Backbone would enable data sharing, artificial intelligence (AI) access, and further software and networks, such as cloud infrastructure, across the Integrated Force.  

The DTW will enhance the “speed and efficiency of targeting, Command and Control, intelligence, surveillance, and situational awareness” on the Digital Backbone.  It will do so by enhancing information gathering and processing as a decision support system for human operators. 

The components and aims of the digital targeting web 

The Armed Forces carry out targeting using the NATO joint targeting doctrine. Figure 1 shows the six-phase cycle of discovering a threat, acquiring a target, assessing the correct response, and executing this response.  

Blue flowchart elements connected in a ring from phase one to phase six. Phase one reads "Commander's intent", Phase two reads "target development". Phase three reads "capabilities analysis". Phase four reads "Commander's decision". Phase five reads "mission planning". Phase six reads "assessment". Phase six is connected to phase one

Figure 1: The NATO joint targeting cycle. 

The DTW is built on the three elements shown in figure 2:  

  • Sensors: detect threats or opportunities.  
  • Deciders: analyse information from sensors and make decisions about the nature of a threat and the best response. 
  • Effectors: act based on decisions. 

A possible structure of the digital targeting web that shows pictures of the three fundamental components from the Strategic Defence Review: sensors, represented by radar on a navy vessel,  deciders, represented by a person examining data on a screen, and effectors, represented by a launched missile.

Figure 2: A diagram of the DTW structure and its three fundamental components from the SDR. 

Unifying systems across the Armed Forces and introducing new digital infrastructure, these sensors, deciders, and effectors create “choice and speed in deciding”. The MOD states the DTW will improve the precision and lethality of the Armed Forces by:  

Hypothetical applications of the digital targeting web 

By fusing data from sensors, the MOD said the DTW will rapidly assess potential enemy targets and help people make and prioritise decisions according to the threat the targets pose.   

Hypothetical example 1 

  1. A Royal Navy ship sensor detects several enemy drones are approaching a UK military base on an island.  
  2. The ship destroys some of the drones, but others slip through. 
  3. The preliminary threat identification data is automatically fed through digital systems to a nearby operational HQ.  
  4. Human ‘deciders’ at the HQ confirm the threat and order a nearby RAF jet to shoot down the remaining drones. The information is also shared with ground forces at the base who track the situation and prepare its air defences. 

Hypothetical example 2 

  1. A ground-based surveillance radar detects a suspected enemy tank. 
  2. The information is fed through digital systems and informs a commander that there is a reconnaissance drone nearby to confirm. 
  3. The drone confirms the position of the enemy tank, and the system matches the target to the best nearby weapon to the tank. This could be effectors such as friendly tanks, armed drones, or artillery. 

Connecting the digital targeting web 

The UK’s DTW will be built from existing and new infrastructure and technologies. The DTW will be built on existing assets and the Digital Backbone. The Army, Royal Navy, and RAF all have projects that will contribute to the Integrated Force by feeding into integrated digital services that will form elements of the DTW. 

The Army’s Project Asgard involves a digital system that “will help soldiers find and attack enemy targets from much greater distances”. A prototype was deployed during NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog in Estonia in 2025 and will receive incremental capability upgrades beyond 2026. 

The Royal Navy’s Maritime Fighting Web delivers a maritime digital capability as the navy becomes a “dispersed but digitally-connected array of crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous platforms”.  

The RAF’s NEXUS delivers information directly between aircraft and ground units at the point of need to give aircrews superior decision-making capabilities.  

Further considerations for the digital targeting web 

Automation  

There is an increasing global focus on automation and AI in military planning, decision-making, and operations. A Joint Service Publication from 2024 said that AI “has the capacity to unlock important capabilities and make efficiencies that, when operated alongside human decision-makers, will maintain UK military advantage”.   

Experts stress the importance of ethics when using AI in decision-making on the battlefield. For some, this raises questions about how to balance autonomy with human intervention to help reduce civilian harm, oversee and prevent errors, and improve accountability. 

A 2025 report by the Alan Turing Institute said that militarised AI could increase the “number of objects found and struck on the battlefield” and decrease the time and resources needed to identify and strike targets. The report also emphasised the “need to explore AI’s influence on leadership and human behaviour in warfare”.  

In 2025, a UN report raised concerns about AI’s capacity to accelerate crises and lower the threshold for conflict. The House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee said that effective integration of humans and AI into weapon systems “is essential to capitalise on the potential of AI and to ensure that its use complies with international law”.  

The principles of international humanitarian law aim to limit the effects of armed conflict and protect civilians. In 2024, the UK Government said the UK must uphold these principles. As of publication, no international laws explicitly mention the use of AI in war, however. 

The UK operates a ‘meaningful human control’ policy towards the use of AI-enabled systems that includes human responsibility and accountability. In 2025, the UK Government said it will ensure that AI in weapons is used in ways that are legitimate, responsible and ethical. 

While lethal autonomous weapons that act without human interference are being developed across the globe with no regulation explicitly banning them, the UK does not currently use them. As the DTW evolves, the UK will balance technological advancement with demands for regulation regarding the use of AI in decision-making. 

Infrastructure, procedure, and futureproofing 

The UK’s DTW will be in continuous development throughout its lifespan, and will integrate existing and new systems while maintaining NATO interoperability.  

However, it may be impeded by delays with digital and physical MOD projects. The Digital Backbone has experienced mixed success, with delivery plans running behind schedule. The DTW will draw from core military digital infrastructure to support operations and any delays to these services may impact its delivery.  

Some commentators say the existing “opaque” MOD digital estate may limit the streamlined processes a system like the DTW needs. Improving infrastructure may be slowed by integrating ‘siloed’ capabilities from across the digital estate, and the compatibility of legacy technologies. 

National autonomy can be undermined by dependencies on international technology companies and this can pose a security risk. The DTW also aims to develop from sovereign capabilities discussed in the National Security Strategy 2025 and a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy report.  

The 2025 Defence Industrial Strategy and DTW Challenge Book identifies keeping pace with innovation as a challenge. If the DTW is to continue to evolve to meet new threats and respond to new technologies, it needs to be designed so that it can quickly adapt to emerging tools, and those that don’t exist yet. Futureproofing the DTW may mean continuous development supported by close industry relationships. 

How will it be funded? 

In 2025, the government announced a £1 billion investment to support DTW development. The first elements of the DTW will be delivered in 2026, according to commitments made by the government in the 2025 SDR.  

Funding for the DTW depends on the Defence Investment Plan (DIP), identified in the 2025 SDR. The DIP has faced delays and in March 2026 witnesses to the Defence Committee explained the impact of these on industry. 

Delays to the DIP may impact the DTW’s delivery and capabilities. As a continuously developing initiative, the DTW requires consistent future funding for research, development, and implementation. 

Related links 

Acknowledgements 

Joe Murphy is a Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) fellow, and Ashlee Godwin is Head of the International Affairs and National Security Hub in the UK Parliament.  

Questions about this briefing should be referred to Simon Brawley, who acted as POST lead for this work.  

POST would like to thank the following people and organisations for kindly giving up their time during the preparation of this article:  

  • Noah Sylvia, Royal United Services Institute 
  • Robert Tollast, Royal United Services Institute 
  • Air Cdre (Ret’d) Blythe Crawford CBE, Director at Tiberius Aerospace   
  • Jeremy Wimble, techUK 
  • Ministry of Defence