DOI: https://doi.org/10.58248/HS63

Overview

There are widespread concerns that extremism is increasing in the UK, threatening the safety of communities and national security.[1],[2],[3],[4] While not all those with extremist beliefs commit violent crimes, extremism can lead to radicalisation, incitement of hatred, and the erosion of democracy and social cohesion.4,[5],[6] Hate crime is linked to extremism, as it is motivated by prejudice, which may align with extreme ideologies.5,[7]

Government statistics on hate crime in England and Wales are based on police records and the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW, CBP8537). Figures for 2022/23 show a 5% decrease in police-recorded hate crime compared with the previous year, although many people may not report these to the police.[8] This is the first fall since the Home Office began recording comparable data in 2013.

The threat of extremism and hate crime tends to increase during periods of global and political change.2,[9],[10],[11],[12],[13] For example, after the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023, online extremism, terrorist threats, and antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK increased.3,10,12,[14]

Our consultation identifying this topic took place in May 2024, before the fatal stabbing of three young girls in Southport in July 2024, which was followed by violent disorder reportedly involving far-right groups.

Challenges and opportunities

Extremist ideologies can manifest in violent terrorist attacks, if not intercepted. The UK Prevent Strategy (part of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST) aims to address the ideological causes of terrorism and intervene early to support people susceptible to radicalisation or who may have been radicalised.[15],[16],[17]

In 2023, an independent review of Prevent found that its first objective, “to tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism”, was not sufficiently met.[18] In March 2024, the government updated the definition of extremism used in Prevent to “the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance”.5 This definition is to be used by government departments to ensure they are not inadvertently providing a platform to extremist groups or individuals.5 The government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation warned that this definition “could undermine the UK’s reputation because it would not be seen as democratic” and that it moved away from “people who are doing bad things, towards people who think bad things”.[19],[20] This echoed wider stakeholder concerns about freedom of speech.[21],[22]

Alongside the threat of terrorism, contributors to POST’s horizon scan raised concerns that extremism can incite hatred.[23],[24],[25] The criminal justice system defines hate crime as any criminal offence perceived to be motivated by “hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic”.8

Unlike terrorism, hate crime is not necessarily driven by extremist ideologies, but is motivated by hostility, for example, toward someone’s race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity.8,25,[26]

In 2022/23, 70% of recorded hate crimes were racially motivated, and there was an 11% increase in hate crime against transgender people compared with the previous year.8 The Home Office noted that public discussion of transgender issues may have led to an increase in offences, as well as better police identification and recording of hate crimes against transgender people.8

Contributors to the horizon scan highlighted concerns about right-wing extremism. The defining characteristics of ‘far-right’ vary, and include a range of ideologies that centre around a narrative of a racial and/or cultural threat to a “native” population from perceived non-native groups.[27],[28],[29] Extreme right-wing terrorism is a concern, with five extreme right-wing groups officially banned, or proscribed, in the UK since 2016.29,[30] However, violence also occurs in the form of hate crimes motivated by far-right beliefs.29 Research covering England has shown that while it can be difficult to predict which individuals are susceptible to radicalisation, local deprivation can increase the risk of right-wing radicalisation and hate crime.28 Some contributors to POST’s horizon scan also raised concerns over inflammatory political rhetoric on issues such as immigration, as it may fuel extremist narratives in the public domain.[31],[32],[33],[34]

Online platforms can be used for expressing and spreading hate.6,9 Online hate crime content can remain present indefinitely, it can travel faster to larger audiences, and the perpetrators of it can be anonymous. This can make it more complex to address than offline hate crime.[35],[36] Online hate crime statistics may understate the prevalence, reflecting both under-recording by the police and under-reporting by victims.36

The Online Safety Act 2023 imposed new duties on providers, such as social media companies and search services, to make them more responsible for their users’ safety.[37] The internet and social media platforms might facilitate extremism by allowing extremists to groom and recruit people, or by acting as an ‘echo chamber’ where extremist narratives are reflected and shared without challenge (PN 559, PN 622).[38],[39],[40]

Exposure to online extremism can be difficult to study, and the link between exposure and radicalisation or inciting violence is not well understood (PN 622).38 Extremist groups use online platforms to seek out ‘vulnerable’ individuals based on a user’s online activity.[41] Policies in the Prevent Strategy aim to prevent ‘vulnerable’ people from being drawn into terrorism. However, this concept of vulnerability does not distinguish between people vulnerable because of existing personal or social circumstances, and those vulnerable to radicalisation.15,[42]

Contributors and parliamentarians have highlighted the need to address the online recruitment and radicalisation of individuals into extremist movements such as involuntary celibacy (incel) and other misogynistic movements.[43],[44] Incels are a subculture (typically online) of men that forge a sense of disenfranchisement around their perceived inability to form sexual or romantic relationships.44 Incels typically share similar characteristics, such as poor mental health, signs of victimhood, anger and misogynistic views. Those that commit violent attacks tend to be young White men.44,[45],[46]

These findings suggest that the issue of incel extremism may be addressed more appropriately using a mental health and social cohesion approach, such as psychosocial support (counselling, mentorship and outreach initiatives), than through a counter-terrorism lens.4,44 In the UK hate crime legislation does not include sex and gender as a protected characteristic, as recommended by the Law Commission in 2021 following a public consultation. The government noted concerns that including sex and gender could have negative consequences, for example, putting at risk prosecutions of serious crimes targeting women and girls.7,[47],[48] Some legal academics criticised this on the basis that their inclusion would act as a public recognition of the threat of misogyny, and warning to those who may engage in misogynistic violence.[49] In August 2024, the Home Secretary announced a review of the UK counter-terrorism strategy, including treating extreme misogyny as a form of extremism.[50]

Contributors also identified lone-actor terrorism (by people who are not part of an organised group) as a growing concern. The definition of a lone actor is not clear, particularly regarding the level of support from, or affiliation with, a wider extremist group, and the motivations for an attack.[51] Lone actors are heterogeneous, which can make detection challenging for law enforcement. However, they tend to be less lethal than group terrorists.51,[52],[53]

Key uncertainties/unknowns

  • A 2023 report for the Commission for Countering Extremism identified substantial gaps in the evidence base on extremism in the UK, and that research may have “substantial structural issues”.[54] For example, the politicisation of research could result in certain perspectives being excluded.54
  • There are known limitations in official hate crime statistics. The 2022/23 hate crime statistics for England and Wales are based on police records, as the CSEW was suspended because of covid-19, delaying the next publication to 2025.8 Police records are not suitable for looking at long-term trends, as increases in recorded hate crime may reflect improvements in recording and greater awareness of such crimes.8 Hate crimes are generally considered to be under-reported (CBP8537).
  • It is uncertain how ongoing geopolitical change will affect extremism and hate crime. For example, the Israel-Hamas conflict has raised concerns about radicalisation, and those with extremist mindsets turning to violence. Increases in antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate crime have already been observed.2,10,12

Key questions for Parliament

  • How can legislation and policy address concerns about online extremism, hate crime, and radicalisation? For example, how effective is the Online Safety Act 2023 in ensuring social media providers protect users against content relating to terrorism or inciting violence?
  • How can the government ensure an effective strategy and interventions to deal with hate crime, including prevention and rehabilitation?
  • How are people with extremist ideologies radicalised and how can the government address this?
  • How has geopolitical change affected levels of extremism and hate crime in the UK, and what impact could it have over the next five years?
  • How can statistics and research evidence on hate crime in the UK be improved?
  • How will the UK address extremism and hate crime while safeguarding individual human rights?

References

[1] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2024). Government strengthens approach to counter extremism GOV.UK.

[2] Corera, G. (2023). MI5 fears Israel-Gaza war could fuel radicalisation BBC News.

[3] Gardham, D. (2024). UK’s counter-terror chief warns of ‘unprecedented’ rise in terrorism threat since Israel-Gaza war started Sky News.

[4] Commission for Countering Extremism (2024). End of Year Report 2023/24

[5] Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government/Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (2024). New definition of extremism (2024) GOV.UK.

[6] Commission for Countering Extremism (2019). Challenging Hateful Extremism.

[7] UK Government (2024). Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021. legislation.gov.uk. Statute Law Database.

[8] Home Office (2023). Hate crime, England and Wales, 2022 to 2023 second edition

[9] Ofcom (2023). Qualitative research into the impact of online hate

[10] Community Security Trust (2024). Antisemitic Incidents 2023

[11] Moss, L. et al. (2023). Trans hate crime rises 11% in past year in England and Wales BBC News.

[12] TellMAMA (2023). Tell MAMA recorded 1,432 anti-Muslim cases between Oct 7 and Dec 13

[13] Albornoz, F. et al. (2020). The Brexit referendum and the rise in hate crime: Conforming to the new norm CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham.

[14] Home Affairs Committee (2024). Policing of protests House of Commons.

[15] UK Government (2011). Prevent Strategy

[16] UK Government (2023). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023

[17] Home Office (2024). Revised Prevent duty guidance: for England and Wales (2015) GOV.UK.

[18] Shawcross, W. (2023). Independent Review of Prevent UK Government.

[19] Francis, S. (2024). New extremism definition unveiled by government BBC News.

[20] Hansard (2024). Extremism Definition and Community Engagement UK Parliament.

[21] Archbishops of Canterbury and York (2024). Joint Statement: Archbishops warns Government over new extremism definition

[22] Reuters (2024). Explainer: What is Britain’s new extremism definition?

[23] Williams, M. et al (2020). Hate in the Machine: anti-Black and anti-Muslim social media posts as predictors of offline racially and religiously aggravated crime British Journal of Criminology (2020), 60 93-117.

[24] Sutton, M. and Wright, C. (2009). Finding the Far Right Online: an exploratory study of White supremacist websites Internet Journal of Criminology. Nottingham Trent University.

[25] Walters, M.A. et al (2016). Research report 102: Causes and motivations of hate crime Equality and Human Rights Commission.

[26] Allen, C. (2017). The Need to Disentangle Islamophobia from Extremism University of Birmingham

[27] Lee, B. (2020). A Short Guide to Narratives of the Far-Right Centre for Research and Evidence of Security Threats.

[28] Belgioioso, M. et al. (2023). Local deprivation predicts right-wing hate crime in England PLOS ONE, Vol 18, e0289423. Public Library of Science.

[29] Lee, B. Overview of the Far-Right Lancaster University.

[30] ProtectUK (2023). The Threat from Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

[31] Serhan, Y. (2024). How Europe’s Far-Right Parties Are Winning Over Young Voters TIME.

[32] European Parliament (2024). 2024 Election results

[33] Hope Not Hate (2024). State of Hate 2024

[34] Townsend, M. (2023). UK government’s anti-migrant rhetoric is ‘feeding’ the far right, claims campaign group The Observer.

[35] Stop Hate UK. Online Hate Crime

[36] Davidson, J. et al. (2019). Adult Online Hate, Harassment and Abuse: a rapid evidence assessment University of East London.

[37] Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology Online Safety Act: explainer GOV.UK.

[38] Mølmen, G. N. et al. (2023). Mechanisms of online radicalisation: how the internet affects the radicalisation of extreme-right lone actor terrorists Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol 15, 463–487. Routledge.

[39] Behr, I. V. et al. (2013). Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Rand.

[40] ACT (2021). Radicalisation on the internet

[41] Scanlon, J. R. et al. (2014). Automatic detection of cyber-recruitment by violent extremists Security Informatics, Vol 3, 5.

[42] Corner, E. et al. (2019). The multifinality of vulnerability indicators in lone-actor terrorism Psychology, Crime & Law, Vol 25, 111–132. Routledge.

[43] Hansard (2024). Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism debate UK Parliament.

[44] Whittaker, J. et al. (2024). Predicting Harm Among Incels (Involuntary Celibates): The Roles of Mental Health, Ideological Belief and Social Networking Commission for Countering Extremism.

[45] Donnelly, D. et al. (2001). Involuntary celibacy: A life course analysis The Journal of Sex Research, Vol 38, 159–169. Taylor & Francis.

[46] Williams, D. J. et al. (2021). Wanting sex and willing to kill: Examining demographic and cognitive characteristics of violent “involuntary celibates” Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol 39, 386–401.

[47] UK Government (2022). Making misogyny a hate crime: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 factsheet GOV.UK.

[48] Law Commission (2021). Hate crime laws: final report

[49] McGinley, A. (2022). Misogyny and Murder Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, Vol 45, 178-245.

[50] BBC News (2024). Misogyny to be treated as extremism by UK government

[51] Kenyon, J. et al. (2023). Lone-Actor Terrorism – A Systematic Literature Review Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 46, 2038–2065. Routledge.

[52] Clemmow, C. et al. (2020). Analyzing person-exposure patterns in lone-actor terrorism Criminology & Public Policy, Vol 19, 451–482.

[53] Alakoc, B. P. (2017). Competing to Kill: Terrorist Organizations Versus Lone Wolf Terrorists Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 29, 509–532. Routledge.

[54] Allington, D. (2023). The national research environment for the study of extremism in the UK Commission for Countering Extremism.

Horizon Scan 2024

Emerging policy issues for the next five years.